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We develop a model of endogenous maturity structure for financial institutions that borrow from multiple
creditors. We show that a maturity rat race can occur: an individual creditor can have an incentive
to shorten the maturity of his own loan to the institution, allowing him to adjust his financing terms
or pull out before other creditors can. This, in turn, causes all other lenders to shorten their maturity
as well, leading to excessively short-term financing. This rat race occurs when interim information
is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default, and is most pronounced
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moehmke@columbia.eduOne of the central lessons of the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-09 is the importance of maturity structure
for ￿nancial stability. In particular, the crisis vividly exposed the vulnerability of institutions with
strong maturity mismatch￿ those who ￿nance themselves short-term and invest long-term￿ to
disruptions in their funding liquidity. This raises the question of why ￿nancial institutions use so
much short-term ￿nancing.
In this paper we develop a model of the equilibrium maturity structure of a ￿nancial institu-
tion. We show that for ￿nancial institutions that can borrow at di⁄ering maturities from multiple
creditors to ￿nance long-term investments, the equilibrium maturity structure will in general be
ine¢ ciently short-term￿ leading to excessive maturity mismatch, unnecessary rollover risk, and
ine¢ cient creditor runs.
Intuitively, a ￿nancial institution that cannot commit to an aggregate maturity structure can
have an incentive to approach one of its creditors and suggest switching from a long-term to a
short-term (rollover) debt contract. This dilutes the remaining long-term creditors: If negative
information comes out at the rollover date, the short-term creditor increases his face value. This
reduces the payo⁄ to the long-term creditors in case of ultimate default, whose relative claim on
the ￿rm is diminished. On the other hand, if positive information is revealed at the rollover date,
rolling over short-term debt is cheap. While this bene￿ts the remaining long-term debtholders
in case the ￿nancial institution defaults, typically bankruptcy is less likely after positive news
than after negative news. Hence, in expectation the long-term creditors are worse o⁄￿ they su⁄er
a negative externality. This means that the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to shorten its
maturity whenever interim information received at rollover dates is mostly about the probability
of default. Whenever this is the case, rollover ￿nancing is the unique equilibrium, even though it
leads to ine¢ cient rollover risk. In contrast, when interim information is mostly about the recovery
given default, long-term ￿nancing can be sustained.
The same logic extends to settings in which short-term credit can be rolled over multiple times
before an investment pays o⁄. In fact, when multiple rollover dates are possible the contractual
externality between short-term and long-term debt can lead to a successive unraveling of the ma-
turity structure: If everyone￿ s debt matures at time T; the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to
start shortening an individual creditor￿ s maturity, until everyone￿ s maturity is of length T ￿1: Yet,
once everyone￿ s maturity is of length T ￿ 1; there would be an incentive to give some creditors a
1maturity of T ￿ 2: Under certain conditions, the maturity structure thus successively unravels to
the very short end￿ a maturity rat race.
In our model, the fundamental incentive to shorten the maturity structure can emerge whenever
a ￿nancial institution borrows from multiple creditors. However, since the externality that causes
maturity shortening stems from the short-term creditors￿ability to update their ￿nancing terms
in response to interim information, the incentive to shorten the maturity structure is particularly
strong during times of crisis, when investors expect a lot of default-probability relevant information
to be released before the ￿nancial institution￿ s investments mature.
The maturity rat race is ine¢ cient. It leads to excessive rollover risk and causes ine¢ cient
liquidation of the long-term investment project after negative interim information. Moreover, be-
cause creditors anticipate the costly liquidations that occur when rolling over short-term debt is not
possible, some positive NPV projects do not get started in the ￿rst place. This ine¢ ciency stands
in contrast to some of the leading existing theories of maturity mismatch. For example, Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) highlight the role of maturity mismatch in facilitating long-term investment
projects while serving investors￿liquidity needs that are individually random, but deterministic in
aggregate. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) demonstrate the role of
short-term ￿nancing and the resulting maturity mismatch as a disciplining device for bank man-
agers. In all of these theories, maturity mismatch is an integral and desirable part of ￿nancial
intermediation.
Our model has very di⁄erent implications. In particular, to the extent that maturity mismatch
results from our ￿ rat race￿mechanism, a regulator may want to impose restrictions on short-term
￿nancing to preserve ￿nancial stability and reduce rollover risk. In this respect our paper thus
complements Diamond (1991) and Stein (2005) in arguing that ￿nancing may be excessively short-
term. However, while the driving force in these models is asymmetric information about the
borrower￿ s type, a mechanism that is also highlighted in Flannery (1986), our model emphasizes
the importance of contractual externalities among creditors of di⁄erent maturities.
The key friction in our model is the inability to commit to an aggregate maturity structure. This
friction applies particularly to ￿nancial institutions, rather than to corporates in general: When
o⁄ering debt contracts to its creditors, it is almost impossible for a ￿nancial institution to commit to
an aggregate maturity structure. While corporates that tap capital markets only occasionally may
2be able to do this through covenants or seniority restrictions, committing to a maturity structure is
much more di¢ cult (and potentially undesirable) for ￿nancial institutions. Frequent funding needs,
opaque balance sheets, and their more or less constant activity in the commercial paper market
makes committing to a particular maturity structure virtually impossible.
Of course, the incentive to shorten the maturity structure may be a⁄ected by priority rules
or covenants. While in our baseline model we assume unsecured debt with equal priority among
creditors and no covenants, we discuss the impact of other priority rules and the introduction of
covenants. Seniority restrictions or covenants can weaken the maturity rat race, but generally do
not eliminate it. Moreover, even when they could, ￿nancial institutions may not be willing to
counteract the maturity rat race through covenants or restrictive seniority clauses, because they
attach a high value to ￿nancial ￿ exibility.1 Finally, even when by virtue of seniority restrictions
or covenants an equilibrium with long-term ￿nancing exists, the ￿nancial institution may still get
caught in a ￿ short-term ￿nancing trap,￿an ine¢ cient short-term ￿nancing equilibrium that continues
to exist even when long-term ￿nancing is also an equilibrium. The reason is that, given that all
other lenders are only providing short-term ￿nancing, it is not individually rational for the ￿nancial
institution to move an individual creditor to a longer maturity. In fear of getting stuck while others
withdraw their funding or adjust their ￿nancing terms at rollover, the lone long-term creditor would
require a correspondingly large face value, such that the ￿nancial institution is better o⁄ under all
short-term ￿nancing (even though that maximizes the institution￿ s rollover risk).
Our paper relates to a number of recent papers on short-term debt and rollover risk. Brunner-
meier and Yogo (2009) provide a model of liquidity risk management in the presence of rollover
risk. Their analysis shows that liquidity risk management does not necessarily coincide managing
duration risk. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2010) show how rollover risk can reduce a security￿ s
collateral value. In contrast to our paper, they take short-term ￿nancing of assets as given, while we
focus on why short-term ￿nancing emerges in the ￿rst place. In He and Xiong (2009) coordination
problems among creditors with debt contracts of random maturity can lead to the liquidation of
￿nancially sound ￿rms. Given a ￿xed expected rollover frequency, they show that each creditor has
an incentive to raise his individual rollover threshold, inducing others to raise theirs as well. Unlike
1In practice, very little ￿nancing of ￿nancial institutions contains covenants. See Flannery (1994) for reasons why
it is often hard or even undesirable for ￿nancial institutions to use covenants.
3their dynamic global games setting, in which interest rates and maturity structure are exogenous,
we focus on the choice of maturity with endogenous interest rates. Farhi and Tirole (2009) show
how excessive maturity mismatch emerges through a collective moral hazard that anticipates un-
targeted ex-post monetary policy intervention during systemic crises. Unlike their paper, in our
model shows that excessive maturity mismatch may arise even in the absence of an anticipated
ex-post intervention by the central bank.
The paper is also related to the literature on debt dilution, either by issuing senior debt to dilute
existing debt (see, e.g., Fama and Miller (1972)), by borrowing from more lenders (White (1980),
Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Parlour and Rajan (2001)), or by preferentially pledging collateral to
some creditors. While our paper shares the focus on dilution, the mechanism, maturity structure,
is di⁄erent. First, as our model shows, shortening the maturity of a subset of creditors is not
equivalent to granting seniority, and only works in the favor of the ￿nancial institution under
certain conditions. Second, in contrast to borrowers in the sequential banking papers by Bizer and
DeMarzo (1992) and Parlour and Rajan (2001), the ￿nancial institution in our model can commit
to the aggregate amount borrowed, it just cannot commit to whether the amount borrowed is
￿nanced through long-term or rollover debt.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the setup of our model in
Section 1. In Section 2 we then characterize the equilibrium maturity structure and show that
opaque balance sheets and the inability to commit to an aggregate maturity structure can lead to
excessive short-term ￿nancing. In Section 3 we show that the rat race leads to excessive rollover
risk and underinvestment, and discuss the impact of adding seniority restrictions and covenants to
our model. Section 4 concludes.
1 Model Setup
Consider a risk-neutral ￿nancial institution that can invest in a long-term project. The investment
opportunity arises at t = 0; is of ￿xed scale, and we normalize the required t = 0 investment cost
to 1. At time T; the investment pays o⁄ a random non-negative amount ￿, distributed according
to a distribution function F (￿) on the interval [0;1): Seen from t = 0; the unconditional expected
payo⁄ from investing in the long-term project is E [￿] =
R 1
0 ￿dF (￿), and its net present value is
4positive when E [￿] > 1. For simplicity we assume that there is no time discounting.
Once the project has been undertaken, over time more information is learned about its prof-
itability. At any interim date t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1; a signal st realizes. We assume that for any history
of signals fs1;::;stg; there is a su¢ cient statistic St; conditional on which the distribution of the
project￿ s payo⁄ is given by F (￿jSt); and its expected value accordingly by E (￿jSt). For the re-
mainder of the text, we will loosely refer to St, the su¢ cient statistic for the signal history, as
the signal at time t: We assume that F (￿) satis￿es the strict monotone likelihood ratio property
with respect to the signal St: This implies that when SA
t > SB











in the ￿rst-order stochastic dominance sense (Milgrom (1981)). The
signal St is distributed according to the distribution function Gt (￿): We refer to the highest possible
signal at time t as SH
t ; and the lowest possible signal as SL
t :
The long-term project can be liquidated prematurely at time t < T with a continuous liquidation
technology that allows to liquidate all or only part of the project. However, early liquidation yields
only a fraction of the conditional expectation of the project￿ s payo⁄, ￿E (￿jSt); where ￿ < 1: This
implies that early liquidation is always ine¢ cient￿ no matter how bad the signal realization St
turns out to be, in expectation it always pays more to continue the project rather than to liquidate
it early. These liquidation costs re￿ ect the deadweight costs generated by shutting down the project
early, or the lower valuation of a second-best owner, who may purchase the project at an interim
date.2
The ￿nancial institution has no initial capital and needs to raise the ￿nancing for the long-term
project from a competitive capital market populated by a continuum of risk-neutral lenders. Each
lender has limited capital, such that the ￿nancial institution has to borrow from multiple creditors
to undertake the investment. Financing takes the form of debt contracts. We take debt contracts
as given and do not derive their optimality from a security design perspective. Debt contracts with
di⁄ering maturities are available, such that the ￿nancial institution has to make a choice about
its maturity structure when ￿nancing the project. A debt contract speci￿es a face value and a
2Of course, in practice early liquidation must not always be ine¢ cient. In this case, if the ￿nancial institution
may want to continue ine¢ cient projects because of private bene￿ts or empire building motives, some amount of
short-term ￿nancing may be desirable, because it may help force liquidation in states where this is e¢ cient (see for
example Eisenbach (2010)). We intentionally rule out this possibility for the remainder of the paper in order to
restrict the analysis to situations in which short-term debt has no inherent advantage, and then show that under
reasonable assumptions short-term ￿nancing will nevertheless emerge as the equilibrium outcome.
5maturity date at which that face value is due. We refer to a debt contract with maturity T as
a long-term debt contract. This long-term debt contract matches the maturity of the assets and
liabilities of the ￿nancial institution and has a face value of D0;T to be paid back at time T: By
de￿nition, long-term debt contracts do not have to be rolled over before maturity, which means
that long-term debtholders cannot adjust their ￿nancing terms in response to the signals observed
at the interim dates t < T.
In addition to long-term debt, the ￿nancial institution can also issue debt with shorter maturity,
which has to be rolled over at some time t < T: A short-term debt contract written at date 0 speci￿es
a face value D0;t that comes due at date t; at which point this face value has to be repaid or rolled
over. When short-term debt is rolled over at t, the outstanding face value is adjusted to re￿ ect the
new information contained in the signal St. In terms of notation, if debt is rolled over from time t
to time t + ￿; we denote the rollover face value due at t + ￿ by Dt;t+￿ (St):
Short-term debtholders are atomistic and make uncoordinated rollover decisions at the rollover
date. If short-term debtholders refuse to roll over their obligations at date t, some or even all of the
long-term investment project may have to be liquidated early to meet the repayment obligations to
the short-term debtholders. If the ￿nancial institution cannot repay rollover creditors by o⁄ering
new rollover debt contracts or repaying them by liquidating part or all of the long-term investment,
the ￿nancial institution defaults. In the case of default at time t ￿ T, long-term debt is accelerated
and that there is equal priority among all debtholders. Consistent with U.S. bankruptcy procedures,
we do not draw a distinction between principal and accrued interest in the case of default. Equal
priority then implies that in the case of default the liquidation proceeds are split among all creditors,
proportionally to the face values (principal plus matured interest). Holders of non-matured debt
do not have a claim on interest that has not accrued yet.
We now describe the main novel assumption of our model: We assume that the ￿nancial insti-
tution￿ s maturity structure is opaque. This opacity has two important e⁄ects. First, when dealing
with the ￿nancial institution, individual creditors can only observe the ￿nancing terms o⁄ered to
them. They cannot observe the ￿nancing terms and maturities o⁄ered to other creditors, nor can
they observe the ￿nancial institution￿ s aggregate maturity structure. Second, as a result of this
opacity, it is impossible for the ￿nancial institution to commit to a particular maturity structure
(for example by promising to issue only long-term debt contracts with maturity T) when raising
6￿nancing for the long-term investment. Hence, when raising ￿nancing at date 0, the ￿nancial in-
stitution thus simultaneously o⁄ers debt contracts to a continuum of individual creditors without
being able to commit to an aggregate maturity structure.
The assumption of an opaque maturity structure is motivated by a fundamental di⁄erence
between corporates and ￿nancial institutions. While corporates raise ￿nancing only occasionally,
￿nancial institutions more or less constantly ￿nance and re￿nance themselves in the commercial
paper and repo markets. Relative to corporates, this makes it much harder to ascertain a ￿nancial
institution￿ s maturity structure and rollover needs at any point in time. This, in turn, makes it
extremely di¢ cult, if not impossible, for ￿nancial institutions to commit to a particular maturity
structure. Moreover, even if such commitment were possible, ￿nancial institutions may often not
￿nd it optimal to bind themselves to a particular maturity structure in order to keep ￿nancial
￿ exibility. We thus view the limited commitment assumption as a natural friction that arises when
a ￿nancial institution deals with many dispersed creditors. In our model, this limited commitment
is the key friction that generates equilibrium maturity structures that are excessively short-term.
2 The Equilibrium Maturity Structure
Given our setup, two conditions must be met for a maturity structure to constitute an equilib-
rium.3 First, since capital markets are competitive, a zero pro￿t condition applies, such that in any
equilibrium maturity structure all creditors must just break even in expectation.4 Given that all
creditors just break even, the ￿nancial institution thus has to issue a combination of debt contracts
of potentially di⁄erent maturities that have an aggregate expected payo⁄ equal to the initial cost
of undertaking the investment.
However, while creditor breakeven is a necessary condition for equilibrium, it is not su¢ cient.
A second condition arises because the ￿nancial institution deals bilaterally with multiple creditors
and cannot commit to an aggregate maturity structure when entering individual debt contracts.
Hence, for a maturity structure to be an equilibrium, at the breakeven face values the ￿nancial
institution must have no incentive to deviate by forming a coalition with an individual creditor (or
3For a formal de￿nition of our equilibrium concept see De￿nition 1 below.
4In Parlour and Rajan (2001) lenders make positive pro￿ts in competitive equilibrium. This is due to a moral
hazard problem that is not present in our setting.
7a subset of creditors) and changing this creditor￿ s maturity, while holding ￿xed everybody else￿ s
￿nancing terms and beliefs about the institution￿ s aggregate maturity structure.
To illustrate this second requirement, consider for example a conjectured equilibrium in which
all creditors expect ￿nancing to be in the form of long-term debt that matures at T. The ￿ no-
deviation￿requirement is violated when the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to move one of
the long-term creditors to a shorter maturity contract, given that all remaining creditors anticipate
￿nancing to be purely long-term and set their ￿nancing terms such that they would just break even
under all long-term ￿nancing. If this deviation is pro￿table, the all long-term ￿nancing outcome
cannot be an equilibrium maturity structure.
We now examine the break-even and no-deviation conditions in turn. For simplicity, in what
follows we will initially focus on the ￿nancial institution￿ s maturity structure choice when there
is only one potential rollover date t: Later on we will show that the analysis can be extended to
accommodate multiple rollover dates.
2.1 Creditor Break-Even Conditions
Assume for now that there is only one rollover date, t < T: Consider ￿rst the rollover decision of
creditors whose debt matures at the rollover date t; and denote by ￿ the fraction of creditors that
has entered such rollover contracts. In order to roll over the maturing short-term debt at time t;
the ￿nancial institution has to issue new debt of face value Dt;T (St); which, conditional on the
signal St, must have the same value as the amount due to a matured rollover creditor, D0;t. This





￿dF (￿jSt) + Dt;T (St)
Z 1
￿ DT(St)
dF (￿jSt) = D0;t; (1)
where ￿ DT (St) = ￿Dt;T (St) + (1 ￿ ￿)D0;T denotes the aggregate face value due at time T.
The interpretation of equation (1) is as follows. If default occurs at time T; the creditors rolling
over at t receive a proportional share of the projects cash ￿ ows,
Dt;T(St)
￿ DT(St) ￿. When the ￿nancial
institution does not default, the entire face value Dt;T (St) is repaid. Equation (1) thus says that
for rollover to occur, Dt;T (St) must be set such that in expectation the creditors receive their
8outstanding face value D0;t:5
Short-term debt can be rolled over as long as the project￿ s future cash ￿ ows are high enough
such that the ￿nancial institution can ￿nd a face value Dt;T (St) for which (1) holds. Given equal
priority at time T, the maximum the ￿nancial institution can pledge to the short-term creditors at
time t is the entire expected future cash ￿ ow from the project. This is done by setting Dt;T (St) to
in￿nity, in which case rollover creditors e⁄ectively become equity holders and long-term debtholders
are wiped out. Hence, rolling over short-term debt becomes impossible when the expected future
cash ￿ ows conditional on the signal St are smaller than the maturing face value ￿D0;t owed to the
short-term creditors at t. This is the case when
￿D0;t > E [￿jSt]: (2)
First-order stochastic dominance implies that the amount of pledgeable cash ￿ ow the ￿nancial
institution has at its disposal to roll over debt at time t is increasing in the signal realization St.






When the signal realization St is below ~ St (￿); the ￿nancial institution cannot roll over its short-
term obligations. This is because the bank￿ s dispersed creditors make their rollover decision in an
uncoordinated fashion. They will thus ￿nd it individually rational to pull out their funding when
St < ~ St (￿) in a ￿ fundamental bank run:￿ When the ￿nancial institution cannot o⁄er short-term
creditors full repayment via rollover, each individual creditor will prefer to take out his money in
order to be fully repaid that way. In this case, the ￿nancial institution has to liquidate the entire
project and defaults. Note that the critical signal realization below which the project is liquidated
is a monotonically increasing in ￿; the fraction of overall debt that has been ￿nanced short-term.
The above argument implicitly assumes that short-term debt cannot be restructured at the
rollover date, such that uncoordinated rollover decisions lead to ine¢ cient liquidation at the rollover
date. This assumption re￿ ects the fact that in the presence of multiple creditors such debt restruc-
5Note that both ￿ DT (St) and Dt;T (St) are also functions of ￿; the fraction of creditors with debt contracts that
need to be rolled over at time t: For ease of notation we will generally suppress this dependence in the text.
9turings are often di¢ cult or even impossible to achieve, mainly because of the well-known holdout
problem that arises in debt restructuring. Essentially, since the Trust Indenture Act prohibits
changing the timing or the payment amounts of public debt, debt restructuring must take the form
of exchange o⁄ers, which usually require consent of a speci￿ed fraction of debtholders to go through.
If each debtholder is small, he will not take into account the e⁄ect of his individual tender decision
on the outcome of the exchange o⁄er. This means that assuming that a su¢ cient number of other
creditors accept the restructuring, an individual creditor prefers not to accept in order to be paid
out in full.6
Anticipating potential early liquidation that arises when the ￿nancial institution cannot roll










D0;t = 1: (4)
The interpretation of (4) is as follows. When St < ~ S (￿), the short-term creditors withdraw their
funding at the rollover date and the ￿nancial institution defaults. Long-term debt is accelerated,
and each rollover creditor receives ￿E [￿jSt] = ￿
R 1
0 ￿dF (￿jSt).7 When St ￿ ~ S (￿), short-term
creditors roll over, in which case they are promised a new face value Dt;T (St), which in expectation
has to be worth D0;t: Together, these two terms must be equal to the setup cost for rollover creditors
to break even.
Now turn to the break-even condition for the long-term creditors. Since long-term creditors enter
their debt contracts at t = 0 and cannot change their ￿nancing terms after that, they must break
even taking an expectation across all signal realizations at the rollover date. When St < ~ St (￿); the
project is liquidated at time t; long-term debt is accelerated, and the long-term creditors receive
their share of the liquidation proceeds, ￿E [￿jSt] = ￿
R 1
0 ￿dF (￿jSt): When St ￿ ~ St (￿) the project
is not liquidated at time t, and the long-term creditors receive either their proportional share of the
cash ￿ ow
D0;T
￿ DT(St)￿ if the ￿nancial institution defaults at time T, or they are paid back their entire
face value D0;T: Taking an expectation across all signal realizations at the rollover date t; this leads
6The holdout problem in debt restructuring is analyzed in more detail in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991). See also
the parallel discussion on takeovers in Tirole (2006).
7Since long-term debtholders do not have a claim on non-matured interest, when default occurs at date 1, all
creditors are treated symmetrically in bankruptcy and the cash ￿ ow from liquidation is split equally among all
creditors.



















2.2 Pro￿t to the Financial Institution and No-Deviation Condition
Consider the expected pro￿t for the ￿nancial institution. As the residual claimant, the ￿nancial
institution receives a positive cash ￿ ow at time T if two conditions are met. First, the project must
not be liquidated at t; which means that the ￿nancial institution only receives a positive cash ￿ ow
when St ￿ ~ St (￿). Second, conditional on survival until T; the realized cash ￿ ow ￿ must exceed the
aggregate face value owed to the creditors of di⁄erent maturities, ￿ DT (St): This means that we can








￿ ￿ ￿ DT (St)
￿
dF (￿jSt)dG(St): (6)
The inner integral of this expression is the expected cash ￿ ow to the institution given a par-
ticular signal realization St: The outer integral takes the expectation of this expression over signal
realizations for which the project is not liquidated at time t:
To ￿nd the no-deviation condition, we now calculate the payo⁄ to the ￿nancial institution
of moving one additional creditor from a long-term debt contract to a short-term debt contract.
Following McAfee and Schwartz (1994), when observing this out-of-equilibrium contract o⁄er, the
creditor keeps his beliefs about all other contract o⁄ers by the ￿nancial institution unchanged.8 The
deviation condition payo⁄ can then be calculated by di⁄erentiating the ￿nancial institution￿ s pro￿t
(6) with respect to the fraction of rollover debt ￿, keeping in mind that ￿ DT (St) = ￿Dt;T (St) +









[D0;T ￿ Dt;T (St)]dF (￿jSt)dG(St): (7)
8This passive beliefs restriction proposed by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) is the standard re￿nement used in games
with unobservable bilateral contracts (see, for example, Chapter 13 in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). In essence, it
means that when observing an out-of-equilibrium contract, a creditor believes that all other contracts have remained
unchanged.
11The intuitive interpretation for this expression is as follows. On the margin, the gain from
moving one long-term creditor to a rollover contract is given by the di⁄erences of the marginal
cost of long-term and short-term debt. Because there is one less long-term creditor, the ￿nancial
institution saves D0;T in states in which it is the residual claimant, i.e. when St ￿ ~ St (￿) and
￿ > ￿ DT (St). This gain has to be weighed against the marginal cost of short-term credit in those
states, which is given by Dt;T (St). Note that in deriving this expression we made use of the fact
that the derivatives with respect to the lower integral boundaries drop out, since in both cases the
term inside the integral equals zero when evaluated at the boundary.





the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to move an additional creditor from long-term ￿nancing
to a shorter maturity, keeping everybody else￿ s ￿nancing terms ￿xed. The no-deviation condition
thus implies that an equilibrium maturity structure will either be characterized by @￿
@￿ = 0 (with
the appropriate second order condition holding), or it will be a extreme maturity structure, either
with all long-term debt (￿ = 0 and @￿
@￿
￿ ￿






De￿nition 1 An equilibrium maturity structure is characterized by a fraction of rollover debt ￿￿
and face values fD0;T (￿￿);D0;t (￿￿);Dt;T (St;￿￿)g such that the following conditions are satis￿ed:
1. Creditors correctly conjecture the fraction of rollover debt ￿￿:
2. Face values D0;T (￿￿), D0;t (￿￿) and Dt;T (St;￿￿) are set such that all creditor￿ s break even.
3. The ￿nancial institution has no incentive to deviate from ￿￿ by changing the maturity of one
(or a subset of) individual creditors.
9Note also that the discussion in the text focuses on local deviations. We do so, since in our setup local deviations
are pro￿table if and only if global deviations are pro￿table. We discuss this in more detail in the proof of Proposition
1 in the appendix.
122.3 Interim Information and Maturity Shortening
Before stating our result in the general setup outlined above, we ￿rst present two simple examples
to build intuition. The ￿rst example illustrates the mechanism that leads to the unraveling of
short-term ￿nancing: short-term debt imposes an contractual externality on the remaining long-
term creditors and long-term ￿nancing cannot be an equilibrium. The second example highlights
that not any type of interim information leads to an incentive to shorten the maturity structure.
In particular, when information at the rollover date is exclusively about the recovery in default,
but does not a⁄ect the default probability, there is no incentive for the ￿nancial institution to
deviate from long-term ￿nancing. Hence, for maturity shortening to be privately optimal for the
￿nancial institution, the signal at the rollover date must thus contain su¢ cient information about
the ￿nancial institution￿ s default probability, a restriction that we will make more precise when we
discuss the general case in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Example 1: Information about Default Probability
Consider a setting in which the ￿nal cash ￿ ow ￿ can only take two values, ￿H and ￿L: Assume
that the high cash ￿ ow is su¢ ciently large to repay all debt at time T; whereas the low cash ￿ ow
realization leads to default (i.e., ￿L < 1). The probability of default at date T is thus equal to the
probability of the low cash ￿ ow. At the rollover date, additional information is revealed about this
probability of default: Seen from date 0; the probability of the high cash ￿ ow realization is given
by p0, and the probability of default by 1 ￿ p0. At the rollover date t the probability of the high
cash ￿ ow realization is updated to pt:
For this example, we focus on the initial deviation from all long-term ￿nancing (i.e., from a
conjectured equilibrium in which the fraction of short-term ￿nancing is given by ￿ = 0). If all
￿nancing is long-term, the break-even condition for the long-term creditors (5) can be rewritten as
(1 ￿ p0)￿L + p0D0;T = 1; (9)
which implies a face value for long-term debt of D0;T =
1￿(1￿p0)￿L
p0 :
But is ￿nancing with all long-term debt an equilibrium maturity structure? To determine this,
we need to check the no-deviation condition derived above. Since ￿L > 0; the ￿rst short-term
13creditor can always be rolled over at time t; which implies that D0;t = 1: For the ￿rst rollover




￿L + ptDt;T = 1; (10)
which implies a rollover face value of Dt;T =
1￿(1￿p0)￿L
￿Lp0+(1￿￿L)pt:
The ￿nancial institution has an incentive to deviate from all long-term ￿nancing when
@￿
@￿
= p0D0;T ￿ E [ptDt;T] > 0: (11)










A simple application of Jensen￿ s inequality shows that this condition is always satis￿ed when
0 < ￿L < 1.10 All long-term ￿nancing can thus not be an equilibrium outcome￿ starting from a
conjectured equilibrium in which ￿nancing is all long-term, the ￿nancial institution has an incentive
to shorten the maturity structure.
The intuition for why the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to deviate from long-term ￿nanc-
ing is illustrated in Figure 1. Panel A shows the face value of long-term debt, and the rollover face
value, as a function of the interim signal pt. As the ￿gure shows, the rollover face value is a convex
function of the realization of pt, which means that unconditionally, the expected rollover face value
is higher than the long-term face value. The ￿nancial institution, however, does not care about face
values per se, but about the marginal cost of ￿nancing from the equityholder￿ s perspective, i.e., the
face values multiplied by the probability of being the residual claimant. This is depicted in Panel
B. Note that once we multiply the face values by the survival probability pt, the marginal cost of
rollover ￿nancing becomes a concave function. Taking an expectation over all possible realizations
10The expression inside the expectation is a strictly concave function when ￿





















where the ￿nal equality uses the fact that E [pt] = p0:
14Figure 1: Illustration: News about Default Probability. The left panel shows the long-term
face value D0;T and the rollover face value Dt;T (pt). While the long-term face value is ￿xed, the
face value charged by the ￿rst rollover creditor is a convex function of pt: The right panel shows
that even though the expected rollover face value exceeds the long-term face value, the marginal
cost of rollover ￿nance is, in expectation, less than the marginal cost of long-term ￿nancing. Hence,
an incentive to shorten the maturity structure arises. For this illustration we set p0 = 0:5:
of pt (and using that E [pt] = p0) we see that from the equityholder￿ s perspective rollover ￿nancing
is cheaper than long-term ￿nancing, which makes the deviation pro￿table.
The incentive to deviate from all long-term ￿nancing is driven by the concavity of the marginal
cost of rollover debt. This implies that the incentive to shorten the maturity structure is stronger,
the higher the variance of the signal pt: To see this, assume that assume that pt can only take
two values, p0 + ￿ or p0 ￿ ￿: The concavity of the marginal cost of rollover ￿nancing depicted in
the right panel of Figure 1 then implies that the deviation from long-term ￿nancing becomes more
pro￿table when ￿ increases. This means that in this example the incentive to shorten the maturity
structure depends on the amount of interim updating of the default probability. This is consistent
with the maturity shortening during ￿nancial crisis. For example, Krishnamurthy (2010) shows
that maturities in the commercial paper market shortened substantially in September 2008, when,
in the aftermath of Lehman￿ s default, investors were expecting to learn which other institutions
might also default.
It is also instructive to look at the two polar cases when either ￿L = 0 or when ￿L = 1: It
turns out that in either of these cases, the deviation ceases to be pro￿table. When ￿L = 0; there
is nothing to be distributed among the creditors in the default state. Thus, the rollover creditor
cannot gain at the expense of the long-term creditors by adjusting his face value at the rollover date
15when default is more likely. When ￿L = 1; on the other hand, all debt becomes safe. In this case,
default will never occur, again preventing the rollover creditor from diluting the existing long-term
creditors by increasing his face value. These polar cases illustrate that it is the rollover creditor￿ s
ability to increase his face value in states when default is more likely in order to appropriate more
of the bankruptcy mass ￿L that makes the deviation pro￿table.
2.3.2 Example 2: Information about Recovery Value
We now present a second example, in which long-term ￿nancing can be sustained as an equilibrium.
In contrast to the example in Section 2.3.1, in which information released at the rollover date was
exclusively about the probability of default, in this second example, interim information only a⁄ects
the recovery in default, but not the default probability.
Again, assume that the ￿nal cash ￿ ow can take two values, ￿H or ￿L: However, this time we
keep the probability of the high cash ￿ ow ￿xed at p, whereas the value of the low cash ￿ ow ￿L
is random seen from date 0, and its realization is revealed at the rollover date t. Assume that
￿L is always smaller than one, such that the ￿nancial institution defaults when the low cash ￿ ow
realizes, regardless of what value ￿L takes. Information revealed at date t is thus exclusively about
the recovery in default.





+ pD0;T = 1; (13)
which implies that D0;T =
1￿(1￿p)E[￿L]
p : The face value the ￿rst rollover creditor would charge can




￿L + pDt;T = 1; (14)






Given these face values, we can now check whether the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to
deviate from all long-term ￿nancing by checking the no-deviation condition. It turns out that in
16Figure 2: Illustration: News about Recovery in Default. The left panel shows the long-term
face value and the rollover face value. Again, the long-term face value is ￿xed, while the rollover
face value is a convex function of the realized recovery in default ￿L. In this case, the probability
of default is unchanged, such that the expected marginal cost of rollover ￿nance is higher than the
expeted marginal cost of long-term ￿nancing (right panel). For this illustration we set p = 0:5:
this example, the ￿nancial institution has no incentive to shorten the maturity structure because
@￿
@￿






Again, this follows from a simple application of Jensen￿ s inequality. In contrast to the earlier
example, the marginal cost of rollover ￿nancing pDt;T
￿
￿L￿
is now a convex, decreasing function










= pD0;T: In words,
from the ￿nancial institution￿ s perspective the marginal cost of rollover ￿nancing now exceeds
the marginal cost of long-term ￿nancing, such that the deviation from all long-term ￿nancing is
unpro￿table. Hence, when interim information is purely about the recovery value in default, all
long-term ￿nancing is an equilibrium.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. As before, the rollover face value is a convex function of the
signal at the rollover date, such that the expected rollover face value is higher than the face value
of long-term debt. In contrast to the earlier example, however, when multiplying the face values
by the repayment probability p, the marginal cost of rollover ￿nancing remains a convex function,
such that the expected marginal cost of rollover debt is higher than the expected marginal cost of
long-term debt.
17This second example shows that the introduction of rollover debt does not always dilute remain-
ing long-term debt. In fact, in this example the remaining long-term creditors are better o⁄ after
the introduction of a rollover creditor. This raises the question how this counter-example di⁄ers
from the simple example in Section 2.3.1, in which shortening the maturity structure is pro￿table?
Clearly, the di⁄erence lies in the type of information that is revealed at the rollover date. In the
example in 2.3.1 the information revealed at the rollover date is purely about the probability of
default, while the recovery value in default is held ￿xed. In 2.3.2, on the other hand, information
learned at the rollover date is purely about the recovery in default, while the probability of default
is held ￿xed. This shows that the incentive to shorten the maturity structure depends on the type
of information that is revealed by the rollover date. More precisely, the signal at the rollover date
must contain su¢ cient information about the probability of default, as opposed to the recovery in
default, a notion we will make more precise in Section 2.4.
2.4 Maturity Structure Shortening: The General Case
Of course, the above examples are both special cases. First, in both examples the ￿nal cash ￿ ow
was restricted to only take two values, and interim information was either about the probability of
default or the recovery in default. Below, we allow the ￿nal cash ￿ ow to follow a general distribution
function, and the interim signal to a⁄ect both, probability of default and recovery. Second, in both
examples we only considered the initial deviation starting from a conjectured equilibrium with
all long-term ￿nancing. Below we generalize the analysis to conjectured equilibrium maturity
structures with both long-term debt and rollover debt. This will allow us to characterize under
which condition the equilibrium maturity structure unravels to all short-term rollover debt.
To show this, we need to demonstrate that under certain conditions there is a pro￿table deviation
for the ￿nancial institution starting from any maturity structure that involves some amount of long-
term debt (￿ < 1). The unique equilibrium maturity structure then exhibits all rollover ￿nancing
(￿ = 1): All creditors receive short-term contracts and roll over at time t. When this is the case,
the equilibrium maturity structure leads to strictly positive rollover risk, such that the long-term
project has to be liquidated at the rollover date with positive probability. The ￿nancial institution￿ s
incentive to shorten the maturity structure thus leads to a real ine¢ ciency.
To extend the intuition gained through the two examples above, we can use the relation
18E [XY ] = E [X]E [Y ] + cov [X;Y ] to to rewrite the deviation payo⁄ (7). This shows the ￿nancial
institution has an incentive to shorten the maturity structure whenever
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From the breakeven conditions it can be shown that Es
h
Dt;T (s)jSt ￿ e St (￿)
i
> D0;T:11 This
implies that conditional on rollover at t, the expected promised yield for rollover debt is higher
than the promised yield for long-term debt. The ￿rst term in (16) is thus strictly negative. This
is the case because the rollover face value is convex in the signal St￿ i.e. it increases more after
bad signals than it decreases after good signals (as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2). However, as the
residual claimant the ￿nancial institution cares not about the face value conditional on rollover,
but the face value conditional on rollover in states where the ￿nancial institution does not default.
This is captured by the covariance term in (16): the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to shorten
its maturity provided that the covariance between the rollover face value Dt;T (St) and the survival
probability
R 1
￿ DT(St) dF (￿jSt) is su¢ ciently negative. In other words, the deviation is pro￿table if
after bad signals and a correspondingly high rollover face value, it is unlikely that the ￿nancial
institution will be the residual claimant. Hence, equation (16) shows that in the general setup the
deviation to shorten the maturity structure is pro￿table if the signal received at the rollover date
contains su¢ cient information regarding the probability of default, rather than just the recovery
given default, con￿rming the intuition gained from the examples above.
We now provide a simple and economically motivated condition on the signal structure that
guarantees that interim information contains su¢ cient information about the probability of default.
(Recall that up to this point we have only assumed that the signal St orders the updated distribution
according to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.)
Condition 1 Dt;T (St)
R 1
￿ DT(St) dF (￿jSt) is weakly increasing in St on the interval St ￿ ~ St (￿):
Condition 1 restricts the distribution function F (￿) to be such that, whenever rollover is possible,
11See Lemma 1 in the appendix for a proof.
19the fraction of expected compensation that rollover creditors receive through full repayment rather
than through default is weakly increasing in the signal realization. In other words, under Condition
1 a positive signal is de￿ned as one that increases the amount that creditors expect to receive
through full repayment at maturity, as opposed to repayment through recovery in default. This
condition is satis￿ed whenever positive information is mostly about the probability of default, rather
than about the expected recovery in default.
The condition thus directly relates to the intuition gained through the two examples above:
Condition 1 is satis￿ed in the ￿rst example, in which all interim information is about the probability
of default (ptDt;T (pt) is increasing in the realization of pt), but violated in the second example, in
which all interim information was about the recovery in default (pDt;T
￿
￿L￿
is decreasing in ￿L).
Condition 1 thus makes the intuition gained from the two examples precise: When Condition 1 holds,
the signal received at the rollover date contains su¢ cient information about the default probability,
as opposed to the recovery in default, such that the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to shorten
the maturity structure starting from any conjectured equilibrium that involves some long-term
debt. This allows us to state the following general proposition.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium Maturity Structure (A). Suppose that Condition 1 holds. Then
in any conjectured equilibrium maturity structure with some amount of long-term ￿nancing, ￿ 2
[0;1), the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to increase the amount of short-term ￿nancing by
switching one additional creditor from maturity T to the shorter maturity t < T. The unique
equilibrium maturity structure involves all short-term ￿nancing.
Why is the ￿nancial institution unable to sustain a maturity structure in which it enters into
long-term debt contracts with all (or even just some) creditors? To see this, consider what happens
when the institution moves one creditor from a long-term contract to a shorter maturity while
keeping the remaining long-term creditors￿￿nancing terms ￿xed. The di⁄erence between long-term
and short-term debt is that the face value of the short-term contract reacts to the signal observed
at time t. When the signal is positive, rolling over the maturing short-term debt contract at time
t is cheap. When, on the other hand, the signal is negative, rolling over the maturing short-term
debt at t is costly or even impossible.
The reason why the deviation to short-term ￿nancing is pro￿table for the ￿nancial institution
20is that rolling over short-term ￿nancing is cheap exactly in those states in which the ￿nancial
institution is likely to be the residual claimant. This means that bene￿ts from an additional unit of
short-term ￿nancing accrue disproportionately to the ￿nancial institution. On the other hand, the
signal realizations for which rolling over short-term debt is costly or even impossible are the states
in which the ￿nancial institution is less likely to be the residual claimant. The costs that arise
from an additional unit of short-term ￿nancing are thus disproportionately borne by the existing
long-term debtholders.
Note that when the ￿nancial institution moves an additional creditor to a short-term contract,
the remaining long-term creditors do not lose on a state by state basis. However, under Condition 1
existing long-term creditors are worse o⁄when the ￿nancial institution moves an additional creditor
to short-term contract. This is because rollover creditors raise their face value whenever default is
likely, while they lower their face value only in states when default is less likely.
Proposition 1 also shows that this rationale is not limited just to the initial deviation from a
conjectured equilibrium in which all ￿nancing is through long-term debt, as in the examples above.
Rather, under Condition 1 any maturity structure that involves some amount of long-term debt
cannot be an equilibrium. Starting from any conjectured equilibrium that involves some amount
of long-term debt, an additional rollover creditor imposes a negative contractual externality on the
value of long-term debt, such that the ￿nancial institution gains from moving an additional creditor
from a long-term to a short-term debt contract. The ￿nancial institution￿ s maturity structure thus
unravels to all short-term ￿nancing.12
Reversing Condition 1, on the other hand, provides a su¢ cient condition under which long-
term ￿nancing is the unique equilibrium. This generalizes the intuition gained through our second
example, in which all interim information was about the recovery rate. More speci￿cally, when the
amount that rollover creditors expect to receive through full repayment at time T is decreasing in
12The derivation of the deviation payo⁄ uses the fact that the deviation is not observed by other creditors, both
long-term and short-term. An alternative assumption would be that rollover creditors notice the deviation when they
roll over their debt at t: In this case, the deviation payo⁄ would have an additional term that captures the ￿ infra-
marginal￿e⁄ect of an extra unit of rollover ￿nancing on the cost of rolling over existing short-term debt. While it is
possible to incorporate this into the model, the analysis becomes signi￿cantly less tractable, without much additional
economic insight. The general e⁄ect of letting existing short-term creditors react to a deviation is a slight reduction
in the incentive to shorten the maturity structure further when there is already some existing short-term debt. To
quantify this e⁄ect, one has to revert to numerical analysis. Rollover ￿nancing remains the unique equilibrium when
negative interim information is su¢ ciently correlated with increases in the ￿nancial institution￿ s probability of default,
but the required amount of correlation increases relative to the setup in the paper.
21the signal St; then the ￿nancial institution has no incentive to deviate from long-term ￿nancing.
Moreover, starting from any conjectured equilibrium with some amount of short-term debt, the
￿nancial institution would have an incentive to increase the fraction of long-term debt, such that
long-term ￿nancing is the unique equilibrium. This shows that when most interim information
is about recovery in default, as opposed to the probability of default, long-term ￿nancing is the
unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Equilibrium Maturity Structure (B). Suppose that Condition 1 is reversed,
i.e., Dt;T (St)
R 1
￿ DT(St) dF (￿jSt) is weakly decreasing in St on the interval St ￿ ~ St (￿). Then the
unique equilibrium maturity structure involves all long-term debt.
2.5 Successive Unraveling of the Maturity Structure
Up to now we have focused our analysis on a situation with just one possible rollover date t. In
this section we show how in a setup with multiple rollover dates the deviation illustrated above can
be applied repeatedly, successively unraveling the maturity structure to the very short end.
Successive unraveling of the maturity structure is illustrated in Figure 3. Consider starting in
a conjectured equilibrium in which all debt is long-term, i.e., all debt matures at time T: From
our analysis with just one rollover date, we know that if everyone￿ s debt matures at time T; under
Condition 1 the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to start shortening some creditor￿ s maturity
until everyone￿ s maturity is only of length T ￿ 1: But now consider the same deviation again, but
from a conjectured equilibrium in which everyone￿ s maturity is T ￿ 1: Then, under a condition
analogous to Condition 1 the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to shorten the maturity of some
creditors to T ￿2: The ￿nancial institution would do this until all creditors have an initial maturity
of T ￿ 2; after which the whole process would repeat again, in an analogous manner. This implies
that in a model with multiple rollover dates, the maturity structure can unravel all the way to
the extremely short end￿ the ￿nancial institution writes debt contracts of the shortest possible
maturity with all creditors and rolls over its entire debt every period.
To state this more formally, we now generalize Condition 1. Condition 2 is the natural extension
of Condition 1 to multiple rollover dates.
Condition 2 Dt￿1;t (St￿1)
R 1
~ St dG(StjSt￿1) is increasing in St￿1 on the interval St￿1 ￿ e St￿1:
22Recall that e St￿1 is the signal below which rollover fails at date t￿1, while ~ St is the signal below
which rollover fails at date t given successful rollover at date t￿1: Hence, in the spirit of Condition
1, Condition 2 states that the amount that a creditor who is rolling over at t￿1 expects to receive
through successful rollover at the next rollover date t is increasing in the signal at t￿1. Condition
2 thus directly extends Condition 1￿ s notion of what constitutes a positive signal to a framework
with multiple rollover dates.
Proposition 3 Successive Unraveling of the Maturity Structure. Assume that Condition
2 holds. When many rollover dates are possible, successive application of the one-step deviation
principle results in a complete unraveling of the maturity structure to the minimum rollover interval.
Intuitively, this successive unraveling of the maturity structure is a direct extension of the one-
step deviation principle stated in Proposition 1. Starting from any time ￿ at which all creditors roll
over for the ￿rst time, if Condition 2 holds, it is a pro￿table deviation for the ￿nancial institution
to move a creditor to a shorter maturity contract, keeping all other creditors￿￿nancing terms ￿xed.
While in the original one-step deviation this increases the ￿nancial institution￿ s expected payo⁄ at
time T, in this case the deviation increases the ￿nancial institution￿ s expected continuation value
at the rollover date ￿: Save for this adjustment, the proof of sequential unraveling of the maturity
structure is similar to the proof of the one-step deviation in Proposition 1.
Conceptually, Proposition 3 demonstrates the power of the simple contractual externality that
arises when a ￿nancial institution cannot commit to an aggregate maturity structure. Not only
does it result in a shortening of the maturity structure, it can result in a successive shortening to
the very short end of the maturity structure. This successive unraveling maximizes rollover risk
and the possibility of ine¢ cient liquidation of the long-term project.
3 Discussion
In this section we discuss some of the economic implications that result from the maturity rat race.
In Section 3.1 we show that the maturity rat race leads to rollover risk that is excessive from a
social perspective and highlight that, if anticipated by the market, this can lead to underinvest-
ment relative to ￿rst-best. Section 3.2 discusses the e⁄ects of introducing covenants and seniority
23Figure 3: Illustration of the Maturity Rat Race. Start in a conjectured equilibrium in which
all ￿nancing has maturity T (dashed line). In that case it is a pro￿table deviation for the ￿nancial
institution to move some creditors to an initial maturity of T ￿ 1 and then roll over from T ￿ 1 to
T: However, once all creditors￿initial maturity is T ￿1; there is an incentive to move some creditors
to an initial maturity of T ￿ 2: The process repeats until all ￿nancing has the shortest possible
maturity and is rolled over from period to period.
restrictions into our model.
3.1 Excessive Rollover Risk and Underinvestment
The maturity mismatch that arises in our model is ine¢ cient. Maturity mismatch does not help
serve investors￿interim liquidity needs, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Nor does maturity
mismatch serve a bene￿cial role by disciplining bank managers, as in Calomiris and Kahn (1991) or
Diamond and Rajan (2001). In fact, we intentionally ￿ switched o⁄￿these channels, such that there
is no reason to use rollover debt: our model is set up such that matching maturities by ￿nancing the
long-term project via long-term debt is always e¢ cient, whereas the short-term debt is ine¢ cient
because it leads to rollover risk and ine¢ cient early liquidation.
This implies that the equilibrium maturity structure that emerges in our model when Condition
1 is satis￿ed is excessively short-term and ine¢ cient. Speci￿cally, the excessive reliance on short-
term ￿nancing leads to excessive rollover risk and underinvestment, which is stated more formally
in the following two corollaries. For simplicity, we state the two corollaries for the case with only
one rollover date.
Corollary 1 Excessive rollover risk. When Condition 1 holds, the equilibrium maturity struc-
ture (￿ = 1) exhibits excessive rollover risk when, conditional on the worst interim signal, the








24Corollary 2 Some positive NPV projects will not get ￿nanced. When Condition 1 holds,
as a result of the maturity rat race, some positive NPV projects will not get ￿nanced. Only projects





0 ￿dF (￿jSt)dG(St) will be ￿nanced in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 states that the maturity rat race leads to a positive amount of rollover risk when,
conditional on the worst signal, rolling over short-term debt fails at date t. This leads to ine¢ cient
liquidation with positive probability. Corollary 2 states that this rollover risk in turn can make
projects that have positive NPV in absence of early liquidation unpro￿table. To illustrate the
intuition behind Corollary 2, consider a positive NPV project with expected cash ￿ ow E [￿] > 1:
When the project is ￿nance entirely through short-term debt, the project will be liquidated at date
t for any signal realization St < ~ St (1); since the uncoordinated rollover decision of the short-term
creditors makes continuation of the project infeasible. Given this positive probability of liquidation













Value destruction from early liquidation
:
In equilibrium creditors will correctly anticipate these liquidation costs, such that in order to
receive ￿nancing the project￿ s expected cash ￿ ows must exceed its setup cost plus the expected
liquidation costs. This means that as a result of the maturity rat race and the resulting rollover
risk, some positive NPV projects will not be ￿nanced in equilibrium.
Both Corollary 1 and 2 become more powerful if we allow for many rollover dates. This is
because allowing for more rollover dates leads to a successive unraveling of the maturity structure
to the minimum contract length, which increases the equilibrium amount of rollover risk and thus
the probability of ine¢ cient liquidation.
Corollaries 1 and 2 raise the question why the ￿nancial institution does not internalize the
rollover risk and resulting ine¢ ciency of shortening the maturity structure. After all, in equilibrium
all creditors just break even, such that ultimately the cost of the ine¢ cient rollover risk is borne by
the ￿nancial institution. The reason why the ￿nancial institution nevertheless has an incentive to
shorten its maturity structure is that starting from any conjectured equilibrium with some amount
25of long-term debt, moving one more creditor to a rollover contract results in a ￿rst-order gain, while
the increased rollover risk only causes a second-order loss to the ￿nancial institution. This can be
seen from equation (7). Increasing the fraction of rollover debt ￿ increases the probability that
rollover fails by raising ~ St (￿); the lowest signal for which rollover is possible at the interim date.
However, evaluated at the critical signal ~ St (￿), the payo⁄to the ￿nancial institution is zero. Hence,
a small increase in ~ St (￿) only leads to a second order loss to the ￿nancial institution. In contrast
increasing the fraction of rollover debt leads to a ￿rst order gain to the ￿nancial institutions in
states where rollover is possible.
3.2 Seniority Restrictions and Covenants
In this subsection we brie￿ y discuss why standard measures to protect long-term debtholders, such
as covenants and seniority restrictions, may not be enough to counteract the maturity rat race.
First consider giving seniority to long-term debtholders. This clearly would diminish the short-
term debtholders￿ability to exploit the long-term debtholders by raising their face value in response
to negative information that arrives at rollover dates. This is because if default occurs at time T
and long-term debtholders are senior (in contrast to the equal priority assumption we have made
throughout the paper), short-term debtholders will not receive a larger share of the liquidation mass,
even if they have raised their face values at rollover. However, making long-term debtholders senior
will generally not eliminate the ￿nancial institution￿ s incentive to shorten the maturity structure.
This is because, rather than increasing their face value, in the presence of seniority for long-term
debt, the rollover creditors may decide to pull out their ￿nancing in response to negative news at
the rollover date. This again would impose a negative externality on existing long-term creditors,
because the short-term creditors may get repaid even in states where the long-term debtholders end
up making losses. In other words, even if long-term creditors have de jure seniority, they will still
not always have de facto seniority if short-term creditors can pull out their funding early. Hence
seniority will generally not eliminate the ￿nancial institution￿ s incentive to shorten the maturity
structure.
Similar to seniority restrictions, covenants (see, for example, Smith and Warner (1979)) may
also restrict the ability of short-term creditors to impose externalities on long-term creditors. For
example, to reduce the externality that rollover creditors impose on long-term debtholders one
26may consider a covenant that restricts raising the face value of short-term debt above a certain
threshold. This would limit the ability of rollover creditors to dilute long-term debtholders by
raising their face values at the rollover date. However, as in the case of seniority restrictions,
covenants on the face value of short-term debt may not always prevent the ￿nancial institution￿ s
incentive to increase short-term ￿nancing at the expense of long-term creditors: as before, short-
term creditors may choose to pull out their ￿nancing at the rollover date. Thus, in order to be
e⁄ective, both seniority restrictions or covenants would have to be combined with restrictions on
short-term creditors withdrawing their funding at interim dates. But if short-term debtholders face
restrictions on both the rollover face values they can charge and their ability to withdraw their
funding at rollover dates, short-term debt becomes more and more like long-term debt.
In addition, even to the extent that covenants or seniority restrictions can reduce the incentive
to shorten the maturity structure, it is not clear that the ￿nancial institution will actually use them.
In particular, to the extent that ￿nancial institutions attach a high value to ￿nancial ￿ exibility, they
may not be willing to counteract the maturity rat race through covenants or restrictive seniority
clauses. Flannery (1994), for example, argues that it is usually hard or even undesirable for ￿nancial
institutions to use covenants. In fact, this is what we seem to observe in practice: in contrast to
corporates, most debt ￿nancing used by ￿nancial institutions does not contain covenants.
Finally, even in cases where seniority restrictions or covenants can restore an equilibrium in
which all ￿nancing is long-term, a second, ine¢ cient equilibrium in which all ￿nancing is short-
term may still continue to exist. The reason is that, given that all other lenders are only providing
short-term ￿nancing, it is not individually rational for the ￿nancial institution to move an individual
creditor to long-term ￿nancing. This is because to induce an individual creditor to move from a
short-term to a long-term contract when everybody else is extending only short-term credit, the
￿nancial institution has to promise a high interest rate in order to compensate the long-term creditor
for the risk that the remaining short-term creditors may pull out their funding at time t, leaving
the long-term creditor stranded. At that interest rate, however, the ￿nancial institution is better
o⁄ under all short-term ￿nancing. Through this mechanism, a ￿nancial institution with dispersed
creditors can get caught in a short-term ￿nancing trap, and only a coordinated, simultaneous move
by a critical mass of creditors would allow the ￿nancial institution to regain access to long-term
credit markets.
27In summary, thus, neither seniority to long-term debtholders nor covenants are likely to be able
to fully resolve the ￿nancial institution￿ s incentive to shorten the maturity structure.
4 Conclusion
We provide a model of equilibrium maturity structure for ￿nancial institutions that deal with
multiple creditors. Our analysis shows that a contractual externality between long-term and short-
term debtholders can lead to an ine¢ cient shortening of the maturity structure when the ￿nancial
institution deals with creditors on a bilateral basis and cannot commit to an aggregate maturity
structure. In particular, whenever interim information is mostly about the probability of default,
rather than the recovery in default, all short-term ￿nancing is the unique equilibrium. This also
implies that incentive to shorten the maturity structure is particularly strong during periods of
high volatility, such as ￿nancial crises, when investors expect substantial default-relevant interim
information. The resulting maturity mismatch is ine¢ cient, which stands in contrast to a number
of other existing theories of maturity mismatch. Hence, to the extent that maturity mismatch
is driven by the forces outlined in this paper, it may be desirable to include limits on maturity
mismatch in future ￿nancial regulation.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove the claim we need to show that starting from any conjectured
equilibrium involving any amount of long-term debt, i.e. for all ￿ 2 [0;1); in expectation the
￿nancial institution is better o⁄ by moving an additional creditor to a rollover contract. From (7)






dF (￿jSt)jSt ￿ e St (￿)
#
> 0: (17)
Implicit in equation (17) is that as the equityholder, the ￿nancial institution only gets paid when
rollover succeeds at time t (i.e. St ￿ e St (￿)) and when the project￿ s cash ￿ ow ￿ exceeds the total
value of debt that is to be repaid at time T; ￿ D(St).
Before proving that (17) holds for any ￿ 2 [0;1) under the Condition 1, we ￿rst establish a
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:
Note that by Jensen￿ s inequality this also implies that E
h
Dt;T (St)jSt ￿ e St (￿)
i
> D0;T:
We now proceed to prove that for any maturity structure that involves any amount of long-term
debt, the ￿nancial institution has an incentive to shorten its maturity.
29Proof. Assume that Condition 1 holds. In order to prove the assertion, we rewrite (17) as
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> 0: (24)
We know that for all St ￿ e St (￿); Dt;T (St) is decreasing in St. This follows from stochastic
dominance. This implies that 1
Dt;T(St) ￿ 1
D0;T is increasing in St: Moreover, from Condition (1) we
know that on the interval St ￿ e St (￿); Dt;T (St)
R 1
￿ D(St) dF (￿jSt) is weakly increasing in St: We also
know that Dt;T (St)
R 1
￿ D(St) dF (￿jSt) must be strictly increasing on some interval (when St = e St (￿)
the expression is zero, while it is strictly positive for positive realizations of St). This implies that
the covariance of these two terms is indeed positive, which establishes that (17) indeed holds for
any ￿ 2 [0;1].
Finally, it remains to establish that ￿ = 1 is indeed an equilibrium. The above analysis estab-
lishes that there is no pro￿table local deviation from ￿ = 1; since (17) holds at ￿ = 1, which means
that moving one creditor from a short-term do a long-term contract is strictly unpro￿table. It thus
remains to check a global deviation, in which the ￿nancial institution deviates from a conjectured
equilibrium with ￿ = 1 by o⁄ering long-term contracts to multiple creditors. In this situation, each
creditor, only observing his own contract, will assume that all other creditors￿contracts remain
unchanged (this follows from the concept of ￿ passive beliefs,￿introduced by McAfee and Schwartz
(1994): when observing an out-of-equilibrium contract in a game with unobservable o⁄ers, a player
assumes that all other o⁄ers remain unchanged). This implies that also a global deviation from
￿ = 1 cannot be pro￿table, because the payo⁄ from a global deviation is just equal to the payo⁄
30from a local deviation scaled by the mass of creditors moved from short-term to long-term debt
contracts. As we saw above, the payo⁄ from the local deviation from ￿ = 1 is negative.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 1.
The only change is that the direction of the inequality in (24) is reversed. Following the same
argument, all long-term ￿nancing is then the unique equilibrium when Dt;T (St)
R 1
￿ D(St) dF (￿jSt) is
weakly decreasing in St on the interval St ￿ e St (￿):
Proof of Proposition 3: Assume that the ￿rst date at which all creditors roll over is date
t ￿ T: We want to consider a deviation from a conjectured equilibrium in which all creditors ￿rst
roll over at time t; and then roll over every period after that until T. Of course, when t = T; the
project is ￿nanced entirely through long-term debt and the proof of Proposition 1 implies that there
is an incentive to shorten the maturity structure to T ￿1. When t < T; on the other hand, we need
to extend the proof of Proposition 1. Intuitively, rather than showing that the deviation raises the
expected time T payo⁄ of the ￿nancial institution, we now show that it raises the expected time t
continuation value.
Let Vt be the time-t continuation value for the ￿nancial institution. This continuation value is
a function of three state variables. The ￿rst is the face value of debt that has to be rolled over at
time t. Consistent with our earlier notation, we denote the aggregate face value maturing at time t
by ￿ Dt. The aggregate face value that needs to be rolled over at time t is the sum of the face value
issued at time 0 and at the potential earlier rollover date t￿1; i.e. ￿ Dt = ￿Dt￿1;t (St￿1)+(1￿￿)D0;t.
The second state variable is the time-t distribution of the ￿nal cash ￿ ow. A su¢ cient statistic for
this distribution is the time t signal St: The third state variable is the remaining time to maturity,
T ￿ t (which is also equal to the number of the remaining rollover dates). Together this implies
that, conditional on all the information released up to time t; we can write the time t continuation
value for the ￿nancial institution as
Vt
￿ ￿ Dt;St;T ￿ t
￿
: (25)







￿ ￿ Dt;St;T ￿ t
￿
dG(StjSt￿1)dG(St￿1); (26)
where ~ St￿1and ~ St are the signals below which the project is liquidated at times t and t ￿ 1,
respectively, because rollover fails. Note that because the face value of the debt that is rolled over
at t￿1 depends on the signal at t￿1, we have to take an expectation over the St￿1 when calculating
the expected continuation value at time t.










To prove that there is a pro￿table deviation from a conjectured equilibrium in which all creditors
roll over for the ￿rst time at time t; we need to show that this expression is positive. From the
de￿nition ￿ Dt = ￿Dt￿1;t (St￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)D0;t we know that d ￿ Dt
d￿ = Dt￿1;t (St￿1) ￿ D0;t. This means







[Dt￿1;t (St￿1) ￿ D0;t]dG(StjSt￿1)dG(St￿1) > 0: (28)
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= 0:
Proof. Proceeding analogously to the steps in the proof of Lemma 1, we can write the rollover
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We now proceed analogously to Proposition 1 to rewrite (28) in as a covariance. Following the















dG(StjSt￿1)jSt￿1 ￿ e St￿1 (￿)
￿
> 0: (35)
This condition corresponds to equation (24) in the proof of Proposition 1.
As before, we know that 1
Dt￿1;t(St￿1) ￿ 1
D0;t is increasing in St￿1: Hence, a su¢ cient condition













33is increasing in St￿1 when St￿1 ￿ e St￿1: We now show that if Condition 2 holds, then is has to be
the case that (36) is increasing in St￿1 such that (35) holds.
Proof. To build intuition, consider ￿rst what happens if ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt were independent of St￿1 and St:
If this were the case, (36) would be equal to (37) multiplied by a constant, such that (37) would
immediately imply (36). Of course, ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt is not a constant and depends both on St￿1 and St:
However, we now show that this dependence works in favor of the proof. In other words, if (37)
implies (36) when ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt is a constant, it also implies (36) when we allow for ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt to depend on St
and St￿1: In order to see this, it is useful to think of the continuation value Vt as an option on the
￿nal payo⁄, and use the result that the value of an option is convex in its moneyness. When the
signal St￿1; is higher, the amount to be rolled over at date t; ￿ Dt; is lower. But when ￿ Dt is lower,
this means that for any realization of St; the ￿nancial institution￿ s option on the ￿nal payo⁄ is
further in the money. When the option is further in the money, the ￿ option delta,￿￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt; is larger,
because the value of the convexity of the option value. Hence, ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ Dt is increasing in St￿1: Similarly,
when St is high, the probability that the option will be in the money. Again, this increases the
delta of the option value. However, this means that if we know that Dt￿1;t (St￿1)
R 1
~ St dG(StjSt￿1)
is increasing in St￿1, we know a fortiori that Dt￿1;t (St￿1)
R 1
~ St ￿ @Vt
@ ￿ DtdG(StjSt￿1) is increasing in
St￿1; which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1: Since early liquidation is always ine¢ cient in this model, the socially
optimal level of rollover risk is zero. Any positive probability of liquidation means that there is
excessive rollover risk. The unraveling of the maturity structure to all short-term ￿nancing leads










Proof of Corollary 2: Proof follows directly from the discussion in the main text.
References
Acharya, V. V., D. Gale, and T. Yorulmazer (2010): ￿Rollover Risk and Market Freezes,￿
Journal of Finance, (forthcoming).
34Bizer, D. S., and P. M. DeMarzo (1992): ￿Sequential Banking,￿ The Journal of Political
Economy, 100(1), 41￿ 61.
Bolton, P., and M. Dewatripont (2005): Contract Theory. MIT Press.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and M. Yogo (2009): ￿A Note on Liquidity Risk Management,￿Amer-
ican Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 99(2), 578￿ 583.
Calomiris, C. W., and C. M. Kahn (1991): ￿The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements,￿The American Economic Review, 81(3), 497￿ 513.
Diamond, D. W. (1991): ￿Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk,￿The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 106(3), 709￿ 737.
Diamond, D. W., and P. H. Dybvig (1983): ￿Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,￿
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401￿ 419.
Diamond, D. W., and R. G. Rajan (2001): ￿Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial
Fragility: A Theory of Banking,￿The Journal of Political Economy, 109(2), 287￿ 327.
Eisenbach, T. M. (2010): ￿Rollover Risk: Optimal but Ine¢ cient,￿Working Paper, Princeton
University.
Fama, E. F., and M. H. Miller (1972): The Theory of Finance. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Farhi, E., and J. Tirole (2009): ￿Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic
Bailouts,￿Working Paper, Harvard University.
Flannery, M. J. (1986): ￿Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice,￿Journal
of Finance, 41(1), 19￿ 37.
(1994): ￿Debt Maturity and the Deadweight Cost of Leverage: Optimally Financing
Banking Firms,￿American Economic Review, 84(1), 320￿ 331.
Gertner, R., and D. Scharfstein (1991): ￿A Theory of Workouts and the E⁄ects of Reorga-
nization Law,￿The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1189￿ 1222.
He, Z., and W. Xiong (2009): ￿Dynamic Debt Runs,￿Working Paper, Princeton University.
35Krishnamurthy, A. (2010): ￿How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis,￿Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 3￿ 28.
McAfee, R. P., and M. Schwartz (1994): ￿Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting:
Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity,￿American Economic Review, 84(1), 210￿ 230.
Milgrom, P. R. (1981): ￿Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applica-
tions,￿Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380￿ 391.
Parlour, C. A., and U. Rajan (2001): ￿Competition in Loan Contracts,￿American Economic
Review, 91(5), 1311￿ 1328.
Smith, C. W., and J. B. Warner (1979): ￿On ￿nancial contracting: An analysis of bond
covenants,￿Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 117 ￿161.
Stein, J. C. (2005): ￿Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(1), 247￿ 272.
Tirole, J. (2006): The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press.
White, M. J. (1980): ￿Public Policy toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules,￿
Bell Journal of Economics, 11(2), pp. 550￿ 564.
36